Allocation of scarce resources when rationality is one of them: some consequences of cognitive inequalities for theory and policy

"Rationality" is understood in the empirical sense of cognitive abilities of human brains for solving economic problems, and consequently recognized bounded in individually unequal ways. This is shown to require treating it as a unique scarce resource, used for deciding on its own uses. This uniqueness disturbs axiomatic economics by a tangled hierarchy, and implies that rationality-allocation can approach efficiency only by means of an institutionally shaped trial-and-error evolution. Applied to the markets vs. government issue, a comparative institutional analysis of rationality-allocation yields novel insights with non-standard policy implications, and thus demonstrates that rationality-allocation matters.unequally bounded rationality; rationality-allocation; tangled hierarchy; institutionally shaped evolution; comparative institutional analysis

Public Choice with Unequally Rational Individuals

As governments lack the rationality-promoting selective pressures of market competition, the standard (unbounded) rationality assumption is less legitimate in Public Choice than in analysis of markets. This paper argues that many Public Choice problems require recognizing that human rationality has bounds, that these differ across individuals, and that rationality must therefore be treated as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its own uses. This complicates resource-allocation in society, which has to rely on institutionally shaped selection processes. But this also appears to be the only way to produce the long-missing analytical support to the first head of J.S. Mill's criticism of government, of which Public Choice has so far supported only the second. --unequally bounded rationality,institutions,voting,politics-as-selection,government policies

Bringing Institutions Into Evolutionary Economics: Another View with Links to Changes in Physical and Social Technologies

Like Nelson (2002), I make a case for bringing institutions into evolutionary economics. But unlike Nelson, who defines institutions as social technologies consisting of rules-routines, I define them in agreement with North (1990) as humanly devised rules-constraints — such as formal law and informal social norms — but also view them, to accommodate most of Nelson's approach, as constraining the variety of rules-routines employable by agents. I show that this definition has advantages for communicating with modern institutional analysis, for clarifying how institutions can influence, and be influenced by, changes in physical and social technologies, and for producing policy implications.institutions; rules-constraints; rules-routines; social technologies; economic evolutions

Interconnecting Ecolutionary, Institutional and Cognitive Economics: Six Steps towards Understanding the Six Links

Many students of evolutionary, institutional, and cognitive economics have been aware that important links among these fields exist, and several authors have worked on bringing these links to light. Nevertheless, large parts of these links still remain poorly understood. Low interest in inter-field cooperation may be one reason, but difficulties in making these links accessible to meaningful analysis appear more constraining. After surveying the links, this paper proposes six steps towards overcoming these difficulties. It then examines how the three fields together may affect methods and results of economic analysis, in particular those concerning certain basic policy issues.Institutions; evolutions; unequally bounded cognition; program-based behaviors; information accounting; basic policy issues

The government economic agenda in a society of unequally rational individuals

What economic roles, if any, should government play? This is still an incompletely analyzed issue that different individuals – depending on their ideologies, rent-seeking opportunities, and analytical abilities – may answer very differently. To advance its analysis, this paper recognizes that human rationality (as empirically testable cognitive abilities) is bounded unequally across individuals, and is therefore a unique scarce resource that markets and government allocate in significantly different ways. The results conflict with ideologies of both socialism and classical liberalism, but agree with two puzzles of recent economic history and with ideological compromises in actual economic policies.unequally bounded rationality, rationality-allocation, markets, government, economic policies

Markets vs. Government when Rationality Is Unequally Bounded: Some Consequences of Cognitive Inequalities for Theory and Policy

Recognizing that human rationality has bounds that are unequal across individuals entails treating it as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its own uses. This causes a meta-mathematical difficulty to the axiomatic theories of human capital and resource allocation, and raises a new problem for comparative institutional analysis, allowing it to explain some so far little understood differences between markets and government. The policy implications strengthen the case against national planning, selective industrial policies, and government ownership of enterprises, but weaken the case against paternalism.Rationality; meta-mathematics; institutions; markets; government

Cybernetics in Economics

In 1965 Kyn and Pelikan published in Czechoslovakia the book “Kybernetika v Ekonomii” (Cybernetics in Economics). This article, which was published in Prague in English gives the summary and discusses some more important ideas of that book. The book was quite successful and influenced significantly the way economists were at that time looking at the centrally planned economic system imported from the Soviet Union. The main ideas were: a) the crucial role of information in coordination of economic activities; b) the requirements of the appropriate decision making rules; c) the refutation of the prevailing negative views of randomness and spontaneity; d) the role of “natural selection” for processes of self-organization in economic systems. This provided an implicit critique of the over-centralized command economy and indicated the necessity to revive the market economy.Economic Cybernetics; Information; Decission-making; Planning; Selforganization;

Public choice with unequally rational individuals

"As governments lack the rationality-promoting selective pressures of market competition, the standard (unbounded) rationality assumption is less legitimate in Public Choice than in analysis of markets. This paper argues that many Public Choice problems require recognizing that human rationality has bounds, that these differ across individuals, and that rationality must therefore be treated as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its own uses. This complicates resource-allocation in society, which has to rely on institutionally shaped selection processes. But this also appears to be the only way to produce the long-missing analytical support to the first head of J.S. Mill's criticism of government, of which Public Choice has so far supported only the second." (author's abstract

Markets vs. Government when Rationality is Unequally Bounded: Some Consequences of Cognitive Inequalities for Theory and Policy

Recognizing that human rationality has bounds that are unequal across individuals entails treating it as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its own uses. This causes a meta-mathematical difficulty to the axiomatic theories of human capital and resource allocation, and raises a new problem for comparative institutional analysis, allowing it to explain some so far little understood differences between markets and government. The policy implications strengthen the case against national planning, selective industrial policies, and government ownership of enterprises, but weaken the case against paternalism. --Rationality,meta-mathematics,institutions,markets,government

2008,17: How to generalize Darwinism suitably to help understand both the evolution and the development of economies

This paper agrees that a suitably generalized Darwinism may help understand socioeconomic change, but finds the most publicized generalization by Hodgson and Knudsen unsuitable. To do better, it generalizes the extension of Neo-Darwinism into evolutionary developmental biology ("evo-devo"), which pays more attention to genomes-as-instructors than to genes-as-replicators, and to the entire process of instructed development than to fully developed organisms. The new generalization has clear connections to economics with a minimum guarantee of helpfulness: it generalizes both evo-devo and previously elaborated approaches that already helped understand specific issues of comparative economics, economic reforms, and transformation policies. -- evolution of instructions ; instructed development of interactors ; multilevel evolution and development ; evolution of institutional rules ; development of economie